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Abstract
Finding and identifying cryptography is a growing concern in the malware analysis community. In this paper, a
heuristic method for determining the likelihood that a given function contains a cryptographic algorithm is discussed
and the results of applying this method in various environments is shown. The algorithm is based on frequency analysis
of opcodes that make up each function within a binary.
1 Introduction
Finding and identifying cryptography is a growing con-
cern in the malware analysis community. The current state
of the art is to locate it manually and identify it based on
various constants used by speciﬁc algorithms. The ap-
proach outlined in this research is to examine the instruc-
tions that make up a function and make a determination
on how likely that function is to contain cryptography.
The properties of cryptographic functions from an opcode
point of view are examined and samples of ﬁndcrypto’s
use are discussed.
This work was inspired by two related pieces of
work. ﬁndcrypt[Gui06a]/ﬁndcrypt2[Gui06b] locate var-
ious constants used in the initialization of cryptographic
algorithms and further provides identiﬁcation of the spe-
ciﬁc algorithm. ﬁndcrypto differs from this work mainly
because it looks at the instructions that make up the algo-
rithm and not the data it uses (for initialization or other-
wise).
The hack on the Mifare smartcards[NESP08] involved
reverse engineering the hardware by examining the distri-
bution of logic gates. Speciﬁcally, the authors looked for
XOR gates that were strongly interconnected, but where
the functional block itself was loosely connected to the
rest of the chip. In other words, the authors were looking
for the pipelining (strong interconnection) components of
the cryptographic algorithm, and its inputs and outputs
(loose coupling to the rest of the chip). This type of ex-
amination is looking for the properties of cryptographic
algorithms that make then stand out from normal func-
tionality.
The type of frequency analysis is similar in nature to
[Bil07]. The focus of ﬁndcrypto is on cryptographic al-
gorithm discovery versus malware prediction (i.e. given
a binary we want to know whether it contains crypto, not
whether it might be malware).
2 Method
The software developed for this project, ﬁndcrypto, at-
tempts to detect and locate cryptographic algorithms
within object code by examining the instructions that
make up each function within a target binary. The in-
structions are used to determine the likelihood that cryp-
tographic algorithms are present.
Each binary (library or executable), is disassembled to
its constituent instructions. When working with libraries,
the symbols are available and the starting and ending of
each function is known. Modern disassemblers, like IDA
Pro, will attempt to delineate function boundaries and will
assign names for each. The symbol name information (if
even available) is not used as an indicator of the type of
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algorithm by ﬁndcrypto, except for veriﬁcation during de-
velopment.
Instead, ﬁndcrypto loops over each function examining
the instructions that comprise it. A weight is assigned
for each instruction and the sum of all the instruction
weights for each function is stored. The result of sort-
ing the functions by total weight is a numerical indication
of the amount of cryptographic algorithm-like behavior
exhibited by the function. This weighting of functional
characteristics allows a relatively quick analysis of a bi-
nary to determine whether cryptographic algorithms are
present and pinpoints their locations for further analysis.
The primary method used in developing ﬁndcrypto has
been empirical trial and error. It is difﬁcult to decide on a
representative binary for analysis, so work thus far has fo-
cused on the C library from OpenBSD and Linux (glibc).
The following sections discuss some of the unique prop-
erties of cryptographic algorithms as empirically deter-
mined.
2.1 Opcode: XOR
XOR, exclusive-or, is an opcode implemented on most
modern processors. It performs a bitwise exclusive-or op-
eration on two registers, a register and a memory location,
or a register and an immediate (constant). On i386, the
XOR instruction is used to get a zero value into a regis-
ter, e.g. xor %eax, %eax, which results in zeroing the
%eax register.
On Linux (i386, glibc 2.6.1, gcc 4.1.2), XOR occurs
5752 times and of those, 5345, 93% are zeroing XOR op-
erations (source and destination registers are identical).
Outside of cryptography, the XOR operation is not very
common. The remaining 407 XOR uses are distributed
among 135 different functions with 64 distributed in two
functions des crypt() and des encrypt() with 22 and 42,
respectively.
Similarly, for OpenBSD (i386, gcc 3.3.5), XOR occurs
3536 times, of which 2033 (57%) are zeroing XOR. The
remaining 1503 uses are distributed among 60 functions.
Of the 60 functions, 21 are cryptographic and account for
1393 uses of non-zeroing XOR. SHA1Transform() alone
accounts for 312 non-zeroing XOR operations.
Because of the high frequency of non-zeroing XOR
in cryptographic functions, it is given a high heuristic
weight.
2.2 Opcode: ROL
The Rotate Left operation, ROL, rotates the bits in a reg-
ister by some number of speciﬁed bits. The speciﬁcation
can come from either a register or an immediate. As with
XOR, ROL does not often occur outside of cryptographic
algorithms. Unlike XOR, however, there is no C operator
that corresponds to ROL, so the only way that ROL can be
emitted is by inline assembly or compiler optimization.
On OpenBSD, ROL occurs 684 times, and of
those, 677 (99%) are in cryptographic functions.
RMD160Transform() alone accounts for 295 uses. On
Linux, there are only 18 occurrence of ROL, and none
of them occur in cryptographic functions. Because of the
high rate in OpenBSD, ROL is given a non-zero weight
for cryptography.
2.3 Opcode: ROR
Rotate Right (ROR) is the same as ROL except that it ro-
tates the speciﬁed number of bits right (towards the least
signiﬁcant bit). This is another opcode found to occur fre-
quently in cryptographic algorithms.
On Linux, it occurs 67 times in the C library, 9 times
within cryptographic functions (8 in des encrypt(). On
OpenBSD, ROR occurs 55 times across 31 functions,
none of which are crypto. As a result, ROR is given a
low heuristic weight.
2.4 No Floating Point
In cryptography, bit for bit reliability between source and
destination must be guaranteed. The differing algorithms
and rounding practices used in ﬂoating point implemen-
tations precludes their use in cryptography. Instead, cryp-
tographic algorithms rely on relatively simple, bit-for-bit
operations.
2.5 Other Observations
When ﬁrst implemented, the algorithm deﬁned above
was combined with a density calculation. Essentially the
weight of the suspicious opcodes was divided by the to-
tal number of instructions in the function. This turned
out to be a bad approach because a number of functions,
e.g. fabs() (compute the absolute value of a ﬂoating point
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number) have XOR operations in them, but are very small
(6 instructions in the case of fabs. This combination
means that short functions are given high density over
functions that really consist of cryptography. While these
outlying functions are very small, it increases the amount
of chaff to be examined versus using the unbiased weight.
The opcodes listed in previous section are not all inclu-
sive of those examined by ﬁndcrypto. Generally speaking
the number of unique opcodes required by cryptography
is fairly small and the combination of all of the opcodes
found within one function is the basis of this work. Each
instruction is examined to see if it provides a hint towards
or against the function having crypto.
3 Analysis
Being based on heuristics, it was important to test ﬁnd-
crypto on various compilers, architectures and operating
systems. This section details the ﬁndings for each. For
each of the sections below, the architecture is Intel IA32
(aka i386).
3.1 Different Compiler Versions
To compare various compiler versions, the C library for
various releases of OpenBSD were examined. OpenBSD
was chosen because its C library contains several crypto-
graphic algorithms as well as normal C library routines
like printf(), fopen(), etc. The results are in Table 1
The various GCC versions reﬂect the times. Ver-
sion 2.8.1 was the last of the ofﬁcial 2.x series followed
by EGCS with then became the 3.x series. This com-
piler has changed optimization strategies several times
between each release, but for similar functions, e.g.
SHA1Transform, the score computed by ﬁndcrypto varies
by less than 15 percent. The relative order stays the same
in most cases, with notable exceptions being those func-
tions added to the C library during successive OpenBSD
releases, e.g. CAST-128.
3.2 Effect of Optimization
Table 2 details the top 15 results for different compiler
optimizations on the C library of OpenBSD 4.3. Be-
tween O0 (no optimization) and O2 (most optimizations
OpenBSD-2.5 OpenBSD-4.3
gcc 2.8.1 gcc 3.3.5
Score Function Score Function
4000 SHA1Transform 4230 SHA1Transform
2320 RMD160Transform 2755 RMD160Transform
2240 skipjack forwards 2240 skipjack forwards
2240 skipjack backwards 2240 skipjack backwards
896 Blowﬁsh decipher 1440 MD5Transform
809 cast setkey 880 MD4Transform
801 MD5Final 811 cast setkey
750 cast encrypt-0x2000 532 Blowﬁsh encipher
548 Blowﬁsh encipher 532 Blowﬁsh decipher
501 MD4Final 494 cast encrypt
462 cast encrypt 494 cast decrypt
462 cast decrypt 433 SHA512 Transform
300 xdr callmsg 266 SHA256 Transform
300 aout fdnlist 90 ntohs-0x3a
206 crypt-0xba0 90 ntohl-0x3a
Table 1: Comparing Compiler Versions
enabled), there is little difference. The relative order stays
mostly the same and the score changes by less than 20
percent.
On the other hand, between O2 (the highest supported
by the OpenBSD developers) and O3, several more func-
tions related to the BLOWFISH algorithm appear in the
list. The additional optimizations enabled by this level,
register renaming and inline functions, cause several func-
tions to be pulled inline, increasing the score of the func-
tion as a whole.
3.3 Different Operating Systems
For comparison, the C library on Linux (Gentoo with
glibc version 2.6.1, compiled with gcc version 4.1.2) was
compared with OpenBSD 4.3 (compiled with gcc version
3.3.5). On Linux (glibc), only one cryptographic func-
tion is normally found in the C library: des encrypt(),
which as its name implies, is an implementation of DES.
As shown earlier, OpenBSD contains arcfour, CAST-128,
BLOWFISH, MD5, SHA1, and more.
Given this base of comparison, the expected results
should be that des encrypt() occurs at the top of the list.
Table 3 conﬁrms this and shows the rest of the top 15 from
Linux compared with the same list from OpenBSD 4.3.
In the Linux results, the numbers fall off quickly from
over 500 to less than 100. This is expected given the lack
of cryptographic functions in glibc.
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OpenBSD 4.3/gcc 3.3.5
-O0 -O2 -O3
Score Function Score Function Score Function
4000 SHA1Transform 4230 SHA1Transform 4230 SHA1Transform
2240 skipjack forwards 2755 RMD160Transform 2755 RMD160Transform
2240 skipjack backwards 2240 skipjack forwards 2240 skipjack forwards
2080 RMD160Transform 2240 skipjack backwards 2240 skipjack backwards
1120 MD5Transform 1440 MD5Transform 1440 MD5Transform
878 cast setkey 880 MD4Transform 1120 Blowﬁsh expandstate
640 MD4Transform 811 cast setkey 1108 blf cbc decrypt
596 Blowﬁsh encipher 532 Blowﬁsh encipher 1076 Blowﬁsh expand0state
596 Blowﬁsh decipher 532 Blowﬁsh decipher 880 MD4Transform
510 cast encrypt 494 cast encrypt 811 cast setkey
510 cast decrypt 494 cast decrypt 554 blf cbc encrypt
436 SHA512 Transform 433 SHA512 Transform 544 blf ecb encrypt
269 SHA256 Transform 266 SHA256 Transform 544 blf ecb decrypt
96 des do des 90 ntohs-0x3a 532 blf enc
90 ntohs-0x3a 90 ntohl-0x3a 532 blf dec
Table 2: Compiler Optimizations
OpenBSD-4.3 Linux/glibc
Function (Score) Function (Score)
SHA1Transform (4230) des encrypt (502)
RMD160Transform (2755) des crypt (312)
skipjack forwards (2240) strchrnul (162)
skipjack backwards (2240) strchr (162)
MD5Transform (1440) strrchr (141)
MD4Transform (880) memchr (122)
cast setkey (811) strtold l internal (111)
Blowﬁsh encipher (532) strtof l internal (111)
Blowﬁsh decipher (532) strtod l internal (111)
cast encrypt (494) wcstold l internal (97)
cast decrypt (494) wcstof l internal (97)
SHA512 Transform (433) wcstod l internal (97)
SHA256 Transform (266) strcat (81)
ntohs (90) rawmemchr (81)
ntohl (90) IO vfwprintf (71)
Table 3: Comparing C Libraries/OS
3.4 Different Architectures
All of the analysis so far has been with the 32bit Intel ar-
chitecture. The same ideas apply when moving to a new
architecture, but some familiarity is required with the in-
struction set of the target architecture. In this case, ﬁnd-
crypto was ported to run on SPARC (Scalable Processor
Architecture) version 9 (aka SPARC64), and Table 4 de-
tails the top 15 ﬁndings from running ﬁndcrypto on the C
library from i386 versus SPARC64. The compiler used on
both architectures is gcc version 3.3.5 on OpenBSD 4.3.
There is some movement of functions in the table be-
tween the two architectures, but generally all of the func-
tions are listed. SHA256 and SHA512 do not appear until
OpenBSD 4.3/gcc 3.3.5
i386 SPARC64
Function (Score) Function (Score)
SHA1Transform (4230) SHA1Transform (3120)
RMD160Transform (2755) skipjack forwards (2240)
skipjack forwards (2240) skipjack backwards (2240)
skipjack backwards (2240) RMD160Transform (1280)
MD5Transform (1440) MD5Transform (1120)
MD4Transform (880) cast setkey (760)
cast setkey (811) clnt broadcast (730)
Blowﬁsh encipher (532) getanswer (670)
Blowﬁsh decipher (532) MD4Transform (640)
cast encrypt (494) Blowﬁsh encipher (500)
cast decrypt (494) Blowﬁsh decipher (500)
SHA512 Transform (433) res init (430)
SHA256 Transform (266) cast encrypt (370)
ntohs-0x3a (90) cast decrypt (370)
ntohl-0x3a (90) tzload (240)
Table 4: Comparing Architectures
17th and 16th, respectively (not shown).
The port to SPARC64 is relatively new, and it is ex-
pected that further reﬁnement will produce more consis-
tent results on this architecture. Lessons learned from this
port will be applicable to other processors as well. It is
further believed that ﬁndcrypto can be extended to work
with various virtual machine environments like .NET and
Java.
3.5 Positive and Negative Examples
The initial implementation of ﬁndcrypto was targeted at
processing objdump disassembly of binaries. It has also
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Figure 1: Positive Example
been ported to work with the IDA Pro disassembler. It
produces a table that can be clicked on to jump to the lo-
cation of particular entries.
Figure 1 shows the disassembly of a binary linked
against a version of the OpenBSD C library. Symbols are
left in the binary to demonstrate that ﬁndcrypto gives a
high score to the cryptographic functions listed.
The second example, Figure 2, shows the disassembly
of CALC.EXE, a popular target for demonstration. This
binary should not contain cryptography, and ﬁndcrypto
gives a score of only 68 to the top scoring function. Sym-
bols are left in mangled form.
Figure 2: Negative Example
4 Conclusions
The ﬁndcrypto software is effective at locating various
block ciphers (DES, CAST-128, SKIPJACK, BLOW-
FISH, etc.) and hash functions (RMD160, SHA1, SHA2,
MD5, MD4, etc.). The block ciphers listed above are all
classiﬁed as product ciphers, which combine rounds of
simple operations like substitution (S-boxes), permutation
(P-boxes), and modular arithmetic. Permutation func-
tions commonly consist of operations like bit-wise rota-
tion (ROL and ROR discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3),
and XOR (Section 2.1) is often used in a modular arith-
metic block. Hash functions are built of similar blocks.
Stream ciphers like, RC4, are more difﬁcult to locate
using this method. RC4 in particular scores very low with
ﬁndcrypto (100) compared with a score of over 4000 for
SHA1. This is due to the way the permutations and the
loop around the XOR operation are implemented. RC4
does not consist of a large number of rounds like the prod-
uct ciphers, instead its algorithm revolves around a pseudo
random number generator.
As mentioned earlier, [Gui06a] examines a binary look-
ing at the operands (data section or immediates within
instructions) to ﬁnd the constants used in various algo-
rithms. By changing these constants or obscuring them,
this method can be defeated. For example, changing the
initial state constants for MD5 or AES would make these
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algorithms more difﬁcult to locate identify.
ﬁndcrypto is not immune to obfuscation techniques ei-
ther. Many methods for packing and obscuring binaries
are available in the malware community. Therefore, ﬁnd-
crypto must be used in conjunction with unpacking tools
like [Dat05]. The technique in this work is can also fall
victim to other obfuscation methods like inserting “dead”
code, which produces results that are never used and do
not affect the function output. Also the insertion of entire
dead functions can add invalid entries to the score. Static
and dynamic analysis techniques, like those implemented
by [LR08], can help ease the impact of both techniques.
Notably missing from the discussion thus far are asym-
metric algorithms like RSA and Difﬁe-Hellman (DH) key
agreement. In both cases, the algorithms rely on rela-
tively simple mathematical operations on large numbers
(512 bits and greater). Because the size of the operands
will not ﬁt into a normal integer type on modern CPUs,
a different data structure is used: bignum. The required
operations (modular multiplication and exponentiation)
are implemented as functions themselves, so the RSA
and DH implementations are simply macro operations on
bignums. It may be possible to detect the macro opera-
tions, though. In the current implementation, ﬁndcrypto
gives bn mul part recursive() a score of 21. This func-
tion forms the basis for modular multiplication, which is
in turn the basis for modular exponentiation.
5 Future Work
The current work has focused on the location of crypto-
graphic routines within object code. It is believed that
combining this work with a heuristic algorithm identiﬁca-
tion method would be invaluable.
Also, the current method relies on relatively simplis-
tic opcode matching. With further analysis, blocks of in-
structions forming a functional block could be matched
and weighted. This functional block method may help the
location algorithm with different compilers and architec-
tures.
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